In the case of McLaughlin v. Caban, No. 2017-CV-5303 (C.P. Lacka. Co. June 24, 2020 Gibbons, J.), the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County denied a Defendant driver’s motion for summary judgment in which she asserted that there was no causal connection between her actions and the accident at issue. The case was allowed to go to the jury.
The salient facts were that the Defendant driver stopped and waved to the Plaintiff, who was exiting a parking lot in front of the Defendant driver. As Plaintiff exited, another driver passed the stopped Defendant and collided with the Plaintiff. The Court found that reasonable minds could differ as to the meaning of the wave, and the question therefore became one for the trier of fact.
Plaintiff, Melissa McLaughlin, brought a negligence action against both the driver who stopped and waived her out of a parking lot, Karen Piccolini; and the driver of the striking vehicle, Mary Caban. Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Defendant Piccolini is based on a theory of “wave-on liability,” alleging that Defendant Piccolini’s negligent conduct consisted of: her failure to observe the roadway before indicating to Plaintiff to proceed; failure to ensure the roadway was clear before indicating to Plaintiff to proceed; failure to warn Plaintiff of oncoming traffic; and improperly waiving another driver to proceed into the roadway.
Defendant Piccolini filed a motion for summary judgement arguing that Plaintiff’s “wave-on” theory of liability fails because Plaintiff’s deposition testimony established that she interpreted the wave to mean only that Defendant Piccolini would stop to allow her to proceed out of the parking lot and nothing else; in other words, Plaintiff never relied on the wave as an indication that no other traffic was approaching.
However, the Court cited additional deposition testimony of the Plaintiff that implied that she assumed that defendant Piccolini’s vehicle would block the approach of traffic such as defendant Caban.
The Court pointed out that the liability of a signaling motorist, or “Wave-on liability,” is premised on §324A (a) and (c) of the restatement (Second) of Torts (1965):
§ 324A. Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking.
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if:
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
It also noted that “When determining the liability of a signaling motorist, the trier of fact must determine the meaning of the signal in question.” Askew by Askew v. Zeller, 521 A.2d 459, 462 (Pa. Super. 1987). “It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine if the signaling motorist’s action was something other than a mere courtesy or a yielding of the right of way . . . Where reasonable minds could differ as to the meaning of the signal, the question becomes one for the trier of fact.” Id.
The Court found that there remained questions of fact regarding possible interpretations of Defendant Piccolini’s wave to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendant Piccolini’s motion for summary judgment was denied and the matter was allowed to proceed to trial.
Questions regarding this issue can be directed to David Friedman
