In a memorandum decision in the case of Pierchalski v. Thomas, No. 672 WDA 2019, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to overturn a jury verdict in the amount of $1,455.99, which was solely the alleged economic damages.
The appellant, Mrs. Pierchalski, was rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident and filed suit against Thomas seeking money damages for alleged personal injuries. During trial, Thomas, presented medical expert testimony and argued that Pierchalski’s pain and injuries were not caused by the subject motor vehicle accident but, rather, were caused by any number of prior and subsequent accidents. Following the trial, with negligence being admitted, the jury found that Thomas’ negligence was the factual cause of Pierchalski’s injuries but only returned a verdict in her favor for $1,455.99 in economic losses. The Jury failed to award any compensation for past medical expenses, past and future pain and suffering, or loss of consortium for her husband’s claims. Thereafter, the trial court denied Pierchalski’s motions for post-trial relief and appeal ensued.
The Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Pierchalski’s motion for a new trial because the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The Court noted that under Pennsylvania law, generally the determination of whether pain is severe enough to be compensable is left to the jury. In this case, the jury heard extensive testimony regarding Pierchalski’s subjective complaints of pain. Also, during trial the Thomas’ expert testified that he did not observe any objective evidence of injury and noted that Pierchalski had been complaining of neck pain and numbness in her arms/hands for years before the subject accident. Further, during her cross examination, Pierchalski repeatedly testified that she had suffered neck and similar injuries in prior and subsequent falls and accidents. As a result, the Superior Court refused to disturb the trial court’s finding that the jury’s verdict did not shock the court’s conscience given the lack of objective proof of injury and the jury could have found that a pre-existing and/or subsequent injury was the sole cause of the alleged pain and suffering.
In support of its ruling the Superior Court noted that under Pennsylvania law, subsequent accidents may be relevant evidence where there are claims of permanent pain or impairment. Pierchalski was making claims for damages for the rest of her life and, as result, subsequent injuries to the same areas of her body would be relevant to a jury’s determination of liability for those ongoing claims. With regard to prior accidents, the trial court noted her prior complaints were identical to those that she now sought damages from Thomas. Given the similarity in the prior injuries and those being claimed in the present case, and her claim of aggravation of a pre-existing injury in her complaint, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court and the jury would need all pertinent evidence to properly decide the case.
It was argued that the trial court erred when it allowed Thomas to impeach Pierchalski with prior inconsistent statements she made in a 2008 deposition when that transcript was withheld and not produced during discovery. However, the Superior Court found that Pierchalski failed to properly preserve and brief this issue on appeal. The Court also noted that even if they were to reach the merits, the Court would still find that any error was harmless. A review of the record clearly showed that there was sufficient evidence and testimony presented to support a jury’s determination and any error by failing to provide a copy of Pierchalski’s own deposition testimony did not affect the verdict and was harmless.
Questions regarding this case or this issue can be directed to David Friedman.
