In the case of Devoue v. American Sitework, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-06003 (E.D. Pa. March 4, 2022, Marston, J.), the Eastern District Court held that a Pennsylvania vehicle owner plaintiff, who otherwise would be deemed limited tort for his failure to maintain financial responsibility on his own vehicle, was instead deemed to be full tort because he was injured due to the negligence of a driver of a vehicle registered in New Jersey.
Under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, an insurance company is required to notify insureds in writing that they have two alternatives for tort insurance: full tort insurance and limited tort insurance under 75 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Sec 1705(a)(1). The limited tort option requires that a plaintiff prove that they suffered a serious impairment of body function to recover non-economic damages, i.e., “pain and suffering.” Under the full tort option, a plaintiff “maintain[s] an unrestricted right… to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers,” including “financial compensation for pain suffering and other non-monetary damages.”
There are exceptions when an insured selects full vs. limited tort, however. For instance, if a plaintiff is the owner of a vehicle registered in Pennsylvania, but fails to maintain insurance on that vehicle, (like in this case) he or she is deemed to have chosen the limited tort option. Sec. 1705(a)(5). If a driver selects limited tort, but is injured by an out-of-state vehicle, the driver would then be deemed full tort. These are the two conflicting principles in Devoue.
The court began its analysis by stating that under Sec. 1705(d) an “individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election, who sustains damages in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person, may recover damages as if the individual damaged had elected a full tort alternative whenever the person at fault… is operating a motor vehicle registered in another state.” Id. Sec 1705(d)(1)(ii). The defendant in Devoue had argued that this exception only applied when a plaintiff had elected the limited tort option at the time of the purchase of auto insurance. The court however disagreed and looked at the legislative intent. The Devoue court noted that the statutory language used the phrase “bound by the limited tort election” four times in the statute. The Court then noted that phrase was only once when referring to individuals who elected the limited tort alternative.
The Court stated, “In other words, because Plaintiff is “deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative,” the statute views him as having “elect[ed] the limited tort alternative” for purposes of the exceptions outlined in subsection (d).” However, the Court distinguished between someone who “elected” limited tort versus being “bound” by limited tort. Because of this, the court deemed that the plaintiff in Devoue had been “bound” by the limited tort election and had not of “elected” the limited tort option. Since he was “bound by” to limited tort by the circumstances, but did not affirmatively “elect” limited tort, Plaintiff could still recover the benefits of the full tort option which includes compensation for non-monetary damages without any restriction.
Questions regarding this opinion may be directed to Paul S. Gambone
